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The paper compares Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) with Sacks’ Conver-
sation Analysis (CA), arguing that CA has answered several questions that originally
motivated the development of IPA, and while doing so, it has re-specified the
phenomena of interaction research. These two research traditions are in many ways
diametrically opposed: the former is quantitative, theory-oriented and aims at global
characterizations of interactional situations, while the latter is qualitative, inductive
and aims at characterizing specific layers of organization (such as turn taking or
sequence organization) that give structure to interactional situations. Their primary
objects of study are different. For the Balesian tradition, it is the functioning and the
structure of a small group, whereas in the Sacksian tradition, it is the structures and
practices of human social interaction per se. It is argued, however, that CA has
radically expanded understanding of the questions IPA was originally developed to
address. These questions include allocation of resources, control and solidarity. Bales’
research deals with them in terms of the differentiation of participants of a group,
whereas CA has re-specified them as emergent aspects of the very rules and struc-
tures that constitute and regulate interaction sequences. The uniqueness of the CA
perspective on social interaction is demonstrated by exploring the display of emotion
as an interactional phenomenon. It is argued that the display of emotion is intrinsically
embedded in the sequential organization of action. Sensitive ‘coding and counting’
approaches can detect emotion displays, but the contribution of CA is to show the
specific ways in which they are part of the business of interaction.
In one of his earliest lectures on conversation, in 1964, Harvey Sacks pointed out the
virtual lack of direct observational studies on human behaviour in the social sciences.
There were, however, some recent exceptions which Sacks briefly commented upon:
Bales has the notion that you can categorize @human behaviour# as it comes out, so that you sit
and watch people as they are talking, and write down categories of what they are doing as
they’re doing it. That makes it into some kind of trick. There’s no reason to suppose that you
should be able to see it right then and there. (Sacks, 1992a, p. 28)
Sacks then went on to describe his own incipient method, contrasting it with Bales’
approach:
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Instead, you take these little pieces and you try to collect those that look alike, and it can take
an awfully long time to understand any given one.1 (Sacks, 1992a)
Rather than categorizing interactional events with a ready made classification, Sacks’
incipient method started from the meticulous examination of single cases, progressing
towards the discovery of structures that organize social interaction. This seems to be
the only recorded comment that Sacks ever made on Bales’ work. And, as far as I know,
Bales has not referred to Sacks. However, both of them created powerful traditions of
research on social interaction which formed the shape of much social psychological
research during the second half of the 20th century.
In this paper, I explicitly compare and contrast the two traditions of interaction
research. The main focus in this paper is on the Sacksian tradition, but Bales’ work will
be used to set the topics for comparison. In the first part of the paper I argue that
beneath the obvious differences, there is common ground between the two traditions.
I attempt to describe the Sacksian tradition, and its most influential line, Conversation
Analysis (CA), in the light of some central concerns of Bales’ work, arguing that Sacks
(and CA especially) has expanded our understanding of many questions that Bales’
research was initially geared to tackle. In the second part of the paper, the uniqueness
of the CA perspective on social interaction will be demonstrated by exploring the
display of emotion as an interactional phenomenon. It is argued that the display of
emotion is intrinsically embedded in the sequential organization of action. Sensitive
‘coding and counting’ approaches can detect emotion displays, but the contribution of
CA is to show the specific ways in which they are part of the business of interaction.
Differences and common ground between the two traditions
The Balesian tradition
This somewhat older tradition originated in the early work of Robert F. Bales. It uses
quantitative analysis to examine human interaction. Interaction process is seen as an
interplay of acts which in Bales’ original method (Interaction Process Analysis, or IPA)
are described by a theoretically grounded category system (Bales, 1950). This category
system consists of twelve distinct acts, such as ‘agrees’, ‘shows tension’, ‘gives
opinion’, and ‘asks for suggestion’. The categories are classified in several overlapping
ways; one classification divides them into those that belong to the ‘socio-emotional
area’ (including, among others, ‘showing solidarity’ and ‘agreement’) and those that
belong to the ‘task area’ (including, among others, ‘giving opinion’ and ‘asking for
suggestion’).
In IPA, the researcher’s task is to find out how frequently actions belonging to each
category occur in the encounter that is being examined. By examining how frequently
acts fitting different categories take place during different phases of the encounter, in
different positions in relation to each other, and how the acts belonging to different
categories are distributed among the participants, the researcher aims to describe the
distinct character of the group: the phases of its activity, and the differentiation in
the roles of its members (see Bales, 1953; Bales & Slater, 1956).
Even though Bales’ IPA is nowdays mainly of historical interest, its influence is felt in
most social psychological interaction research which categorizes behaviour and counts
it. For example, in research on doctor–patient interactions, Bales’ original method was
1I thank David Silverman for drawing my attention to this extract in Sacks’ lectures.
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actively used up until the 1980s (e.g. Brownbridge et al., 1986; Carter, Inui, Kukul, &
Haigh, 1982; Davis, 1971; Korsch, Gozzi, & Francis, 1968; Stewart, 1983, 1984), and
several newer research methodologies are in great debt to Bales. In general social
psychology, one contemporary example of approaches building upon Bales’ findings –
although not a direct continuation of Bales’ work – is Expectation States Theory (see
Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). That IPA continuously serves as a model for observing and
understanding social behaviour is also evident in textbooks: for example, the methods
section of the influential European introduction to social psychology (Manstead
& Semin, 2001) discusses only three observational methods: participant observation
non-participant observation and Bales’ IPA.
Originally, the method was developed for examining problem solving discussion
groups set up for research purposes in a laboratory setting; but it can be and has been
used in research on various different types of face-to-face encounters, including natu-
rally occurring ones (cf. Bales, 1953; Eskola, 1961). After his trail-blazing studies in the
1940s and 1950s, Bales further developed his method and theory by integrating in it
the analysis of values (Bales & Couch, 1969) and resulting in the new method of
‘Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups’ (Bales, 1999; Bales & Cohen, 1977).
IPA has been criticized for failing to produce explicit and intersubjective accounts of
the coding process (Mishler, 1984, pp. 37–41), for failing to deal with the multiple
dimensions of action, especially actions that have both ‘task’ and ‘socio-emotional’
components contained within them (Wasserman & Inui 1983), and for lack of sensitiv-
ity to the character of specific interaction environments, such as medical consultations
(Byrne & Long, 1976, p. 30; Mishler, 1984, p.41; Wasserman & Inui, 1983). New
quantitative methods for the study of social interaction have been developed in partial
response to these criticisms. These include Thomas, Bull, and Roger’s (1982) Conver-
sational Exchange Analysis, Roter’s (1991) Interaction Analysis (which is adapted to one
specific environment, medical consultation) and Stiles’ (1992) Verbal Response Mode
Analysis (which involves an effort to deal with some multiple dimensions of action).
The category systems in these approaches vary, but in all of them, social interaction is
treated as a process that unfolds in and through distinct acts that can be divided into a
limited set of categories (cf. Bull & Roger, 1988). In this paper, I focus on Bales’ IPA,
the original, most influential and still best known approach, even though many of my
arguments will apply to the other ‘coding and counting’ approaches as well.
The Sacksian tradition
About 15 years later than Robert Bales, Harvey Sacks and his colleagues started to
pursue a quite different kind of interaction research (Sacks 1992a, 1992b; Schegloff,
1992b; Silverman, 1998). Research in the Sacksian tradition is most often called Con-
versation analysis (CA; for a contextualization of CA within social psychology, see
Maynard and Whalen @1995# and Maynard and Peräkylä @2003#); Sacks’ work has also
offered crucial insights for discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter,
1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two traditions concerns the
primary object of study. In the Balesian tradition, it is the small group, its functioning
and its structure, which is the main focus. IPA is a tool for gaining insight into matters
such as differentiation of roles or leadership in small groups. In the Sacksian tradition,
the primary objects of study are the structures and practices of human social inter-
action per se – not interaction as a carrier of other social phenomena (see Heritage,
1995; Kendon, 1987; Schegloff, 1992b; Zimmerman & Boden, 1991).
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There are many other differences as well. Research done in the Sacksian tradition is
qualitative, whereas in the Balesian tradition it is quantitative. Bales studied primarily
group discussions organized for research purposes, while Sacks insisted on the exclu-
sive use of naturally occurring data. The action categories used in IPA were largely
derived from (Parsonian) social theory, whereas research in CA proceeds on an induc-
tive basis (Clayman & Maynard, 1995), starting from the examination of single se-
quences of interaction. Balesian research aims at rather global descriptions of the
interactional events being studied, whereas in the Sacksian tradition, the researcher
focuses on discrete aspects of the organization of the interaction (such as turn taking,
sequence organization, repair or choice of words) and their intersections, without
trying to give a global description of the interactions in which they occur. And finally,
through focusing on the frequencies of distinct types of actions, the Balesian tradition
presupposes that the meanings of actions inhere in those actions themselves: a single
act is to be characterized as ‘giving opinion’, ‘asking for suggestion’ or the like. Only in
the event of classification dilemmas, does the context (what happened just before and
immediately after the act that is being considered) become prominent and relevant
(Bales, 1950, pp. 90–92). In CA, however, research focuses on the reflexive construc-
tion of the meaning of actions: what a single act is gets defined by the interacting
partners in and through the larger sequence of acts that a single action is part of
(Heritage, 1984a).
My own intellectual home is in the Sacksian tradition. In this paper, however, I wish
to examine the kinds of challenges Bales’ work poses for CA and show how CA might
respond to these, as part of the broader project of developing and adequate social
psychology of social interaction.
Bales’ questions to Sacks
A central theoretical concern of Bales, associated with the development of the IPA
method, involved the formulation of the main dimensions of the relationship
between the participants of any group. In his 1950 book, Bales (p. 73) identified four
such dimensions; they all involve the differentiation of the participants. First, there is
differentiation in access to resources; second, differentiation in control over other
persons; third, differentiation in status in terms of importance or prestige; and fourth,
differentiation in solidarity. The 1950 scheme was not followed up in this form in
Bales’ later work, but it served as the backdrop for the development of his later studies
on differentiation in leadership functions (for example, Bales & Slater, 1956).
According to Bales, differentiation between participants can change momentarily,
but it tends to become institutionalized, thereby establishing the social structure of the
group. Here, I deal with three out of the four dimensions Bales picked up: access to
resources, control and solidarity. The position of the fourth dimension (differentiation
in status) is somewhat ambivalent: in empirical terms, Bales saw it as a product of the
three other dimensions rather than as independent (Bales, 1950, pp. 167–168). Bales
maintained that all dimensions of differentiation could be measured using the 12-item
category system. He proposed concrete mathematical formulae to describe the degree
of differentiation in a group and the positions of each member in these dimensions
(Bales, 1950, pp. 165–172).
In the following, I attempt to interrogate the Sacksian tradition, using Bales’ terms.
I will show how CA deals with questions pertaining to allocation of resources, control
and solidarity. These questions are neither the starting point nor the manifest focus of
the CA studies but, in its own inductive way, the CA has developed answers to them.
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Even more importantly, I will argue that CA entails a re-specification of phenomena
and research questions pertaining to allocation of resources, control and solidarity, and
this re-specification opens up avenues of understanding that cannot be reached using a
‘coding and counting’ approach such as IPA.
The ways in which CA deals with these questions is very different. Bales’ exper-
iments with small groups made observable the process whereby the participants’
original expectations (their ‘frame of reference’) concerning the differentiation
between them became realized and institutionalized (Bales, 1950, pp. 72–73). The
experiments involved an attempt to understand the genesis, or the original develop-
ment, of the differentiation (see Bales, 1950, pp. 153–154; Bales, 1999, p. 159; Bales &
Slater 1956). The Sacksian tradition, in contrast, examines social structures in naturally
occurring environments. Normally, it does not aim at understanding the evolution of
these structures, instead, it seeks to describe in detail their functioning. Instead of
examining actions as an expression of the differentiation of the participants, CA studies
examine the structure of the very actions. For CA, ‘structure’ is primarily a property of
action sequences (such as questions and answers, or announcement and receipt; see
Heritage & Atkinson, 1984), and in the analysis, the relations between persons are seen
as derivative of such structures of actions (see e.g. Maynard, 1991).
Access to resources
In spite of these fundamental differences in approach, Bales’ research questions can
help us to understand the potential of the Sacksian tradition. One dimension of the
relationship between the participants of a group, according to Bales, was access to
resources (Bales, 1950, pp. 74–75). Bales pointed out that members of a group often
do not have equal access to some of the resources (e.g. goods or skills) that are
necessary for attaining goals. If unpredictable, the distribution of resources may create
tensions. Hence, there is a pressure towards the stabilization of rights and duties with
regard to this distribution.
The Sacksian tradition has dealt with both cognitive andmaterial resources; in what
follows, I focus on the former. Cognitive resources – in terms of expert skills and
knowledge – were indeed central also for Bales (see Bales, 1950, p. 81). Several
conversation analytical studies have explored the ways in which the possession of
knowledge, and the authority arising from it, are produced by interaction, and, in their
turn, shape it, both in ordinary conversation (Goodwin, 1984, 1986, 1987; Schegloff,
1992a) and in institutional environments (e.g. Drew, 1991; Maynard, 1991).
Let us consider some recent studies in the field of doctor–patient interactions.
Christian Heath (1992) has demonstrated the asymmetry of medical consultations, by
showing how in Britain, patients in GP consultations frequently remain passive (either
by staying silent or by producing minimal responses) after having heard the diagnosis
by the doctor. Heath regards this silence as indicative of the patient’s orientation to
the doctor’s authority in the field of diagnostic reasoning: the doctor has privileged
access to resources of diagnostic reasoning. Following Heath’s study, researchers have
explored other aspects of the distribution of the resources of medical reasoning in
consultations. Peräkylä (1998) demonstrated how the doctors in Finnish primary
health care systematically, either verbally or through the placement of their diagnostic
utterances, make available for the patients some of the grounds of their diagnostic
conclusions. In making these available for the patient, the doctors treat themselves
accountable for their diagnostic reasoning – and thereby, they do not claim that they
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possess exclusive access to the resources of diagnostic reasoning. Moreover, the doc-
tors’ choices concerning the ways in which they make the grounds of the diagnosis
available for the patients are not without consequences: in those cases when the
doctors verbally explicate the grounds of their diagnostic conclusions, the patients
start to talk about the diagnosis relatively often (Peräkylä, 2002, and forthcoming). Yet
another aspect of patients’ access to cognitive resources has been explored by Gill
(1998) and Raevaara (1996, 2000), who have examined the patients’ explanatory
proposals delivered during the consultation: these frequently given proposals demon-
strate that the patients, too, have legitimate access to resources of medical reasoning,
although these resources are different from those of the physician.
These studies yield an emergent picture of the local production of the doctor’s
authority, counterbalanced by the doctor’s accountability and the patient’s demon-
strable access to some aspects of medical reasoning. It appears, therefore, that within
CA, it is possible to observe the distribution of resources in the details of social
interaction. In comparison to the Balesian approach, CA involves a re-specification
of questions concerning the distribution of resources. CA studies do not aim at giving
an in toto characterization of the participants’ relations in terms of their access to
resources (cf. Bales, 1950, pp. 167–168). Instead, they focus on specific sequences
(such as the delivery and reception of patients’ explanatory proposals, or the delivery
and reception of doctors’ diagnostic conclusions). And, through the examination of
these, they gradually uncover the ways in which cognitive resources are distributed
and redistributed in specific moments of interaction. The discovery of these
sequences, and the understanding of their implications for the allocation of cognitive
resources, was only possible through naturalistic, inductive and qualitative research. In
a similar fashion, the studies by Goodwin (1994, 1995) and Heath and Luff (2000) offer
accounts of the practices through which access to artifacts and tools is regulated
in technological working environments. In the future, it would be possible to study
the participants’ ways of dealing with their differentiated access to other material
resources, for example by studying sequences where questions about medical
insurance, sick leave or fees for service are discussed.
Control
For Bales, control over other persons was another basic dimension to the differenti-
ation of the participants of a group. Because persons can control one another, and
because control of another person’s action is often necessary for the attainment of
individual and collective goals, there is an inherent need in any group for institutional-
ization of control in terms of rights and duties (Bales, 1950, pp. 75–76). There is an
intriguing paradox in the Sacksian tradition’s relation to issues of control. On one
hand, there are very few, if any, explicit discussions about control in the central CA
texts. If, indeed, control is understood as a unilateral process where the controlled
party has no choice but to obey, then it is something that cannot be found in the
spoken interaction investigated by CA.2 However, if reciprocity is allowed in the
notion of control, then many CA findings are very relevant. CA studies show how
parties to any interaction constrain the actions of one another, and how the con-
strained parties construct their subsequent responses in terms of alignment, misalign-
ment or resistance. Or, in more technical terms, CA studies have examined different
2Acts of physical or mental violence, discussed by Billig (1998) perhaps come closest to unilateral control. Even in these
acts, however, as long as the victims are alive, they probably make interactional choices.
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realizations of sequential implicativeness (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) between turns:
how a question (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), assessment (Pomerantz, 1984), story preface
(Sacks, 1974) or any other accountably produced action shapes the field of possibilities
on which the next speaker inevitably will operate (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984). CA
studies also highlight the reciprocity of control by showing, for example, how answer-
ers can resist the presuppositions of the questions (Peräkylä, 1995, ch. 7) or how the
recipients can ‘heckle’ the production of a story (Sacks, 1974).
Therefore, CA has developed, off record as it were, pivotal means for the study of
the ‘microphysics’ of control in social interaction, understood as a reciprocal process.
And again, as compared with the Balesian approach, CA has re-specified the research
questions. For conversation analysts, the primary site of control is neither in persons
nor in their relations, but in actions and sequences of actions. Whatever shape the
patterns of control between persons or within groups take, these patterns rest upon
the sequences of action that CA aims at describing.
Taking one more example from doctor–patient interaction, Ruusuvuori (2000) has
recently examined the ways in which primary care patients tell doctors the reason for
their visit. Often, instead of delivering a plain answer to the doctor’s opening question,
the patients embark upon a narrative, starting from the appearance of the first symp-
toms, for example, and only gradually approaching the here and now situation. By
using this narrative format, the patient invites the doctor to adopt the position of a
recipient until the narrative reaches the present moment. The doctors usually align as
recipients, thus on their part facilitating the narrative. However, here also the control
relation is reciprocal – as indeed in the production and reception of any turns at talk
(Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and narratives (Sacks 1974; Schegloff, 1992a).
First, by beginning a story-formatted problem delivery the patients make it relevant
for the doctors to adopt the recipient position, and hence, doctors also can account-
ably decline that position. In more specific terms, Ruusuvuori (2001) has shown,
for example, how the doctors’ gaze operates as a means for control during the
patients’ stories. Gaze withdrawal in key moments of the stories result in observable
perturbations in the progression of the narrative (see Goodwin, 1984).
To summarize, the Sacksian tradition has developed pivotal means for the examin-
ation of control in social interaction. It has re-specified questions about control by
showing how control in interaction is rooted in sequences of action and how it is
co-produced by all parties involved. Again, by starting from the case-by-case analysis of
actual instances of interaction, CA has gained access to the details of the operation
of sequences where control is exercised and resisted.
Solidarity
For Bales (1950; pp. 78–80), the third basic dimension of social relations within a
group involves solidarity. Bales regarded socio-emotional acts as the carriers of solidar-
ity (1950, pp. 168–169). ‘Shows solidarity’, ‘shows tension release’ and ‘agrees’ are the
positive acts in the socio-emotional area, whereas ‘disagrees’, ‘shows tension’ and
‘shows antagonism’ are the negative acts.
As with resources and control, the Sacksian tradition investigates solidarity through
the examination of specific types of sequences. Agreements and disagreements, which
for Bales were central vehicles of solidarity, have also been examined by conversation
analysts. Anita Pomerantz (1984; see also Heritage, 1984a; Schegloff, 1995) showed, for
example, how the organization of social interaction gives preferred status to agree-
ments (as opposed to disagreements), as well as to, for example, positive responses to
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requests (as opposed to rejections) and – on another level of organization – offers of
help (as opposed to requests for it). The preferred status of these acts (’preference
organization’) is manifest in the manner of their production: they are produced straight
away, without delay and hesitation, as unmarked (Levinson, 1983). Their counterparts
(disagreements, rejections of requests, and so on) are, in contrast, produced as
marked: they are typically delayed and accompanied by hesitations, mitigation and
accounts.
As Heritage (1984a; see also Pomerantz, 1984) points out, these CA findings throw
light on the structural basis of solidarity in social interaction. As a result of preference
organization, acts that maintain solidarity in a straightforward way are systematically
distinguished from those acts that are problematic in terms of solidarity. And more-
over, through their unmarked production, the former types of acts are treated as the
‘default’ option. Thus, again, the Sacksian tradition ends up dealing with the same
issues that Bales was also interested in, re-specifying the questions and phenomena of
research. For CA, the heart of solidarity resides in the organization of action, not in
relations between persons per se. This re-specification has made it possible to give a
more sensitive account of solidarity. For example, conversation analysts have shown
how ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’ components are often mingled: disagreements are
often preceded by agreement components, and acts that show agreement in a down-
graded way can engender sequences where disagreement becomes apparent
(Pomerantz, 1984). In such cases, to code actions simply as ‘agreements’ or ‘disagree-
ments’ does not do sufficient justice to the actuality of the phenomenon.
From distributional phenomena to structures of action
Access to resources, control and solidarity were the three central theoretical themes
motivating and permeating Bales’ interaction process analysis. According to Bales
(1950, p. 30), these and related themes have ‘gone into the construction’ of the IPA
categories. The IPA category system made it possible to study these themes as distribu-
tional phenomena: as results of the accumulative choices of action by the participants
in small groups.
CA, as noted, did not originate from these kinds of theoretical considerations.
Instead, it was started by Sacks and his co-workers as a new form of naturalistic inquiry
into the practices and structures of interaction as phenomena in their own right.
However, I have demonstrated how research in CA has yielded results covering the
very themes that Bales suggested IPA was developed to deal with. There is much more
in common between these traditions than is usually thought (see e.g. Psathas, 1994).
But, as compared to the Balesian approach, CA has also re-specified the phenomena
and research questions of interaction analysis. The central focus of all CA studies is on
the organization of sequences of actions. Therefore, CA studies have elucidated ‘access
to resources’, ‘control’ and ‘solidarity’ not as distributional phenomena pertaining to
the differentiation of the members of a group, but as emergent aspects of the very rules
and structures that constitute and regulate interaction sequences.
It would be premature to suggest, however, that ‘coding and counting’ is always the
less fruitful choice for a method in interaction research. There are research questions –
for example, pertaining to process-outcome correlations in clinical interactions (e.g.
Leuzinger-Bohleber & Target, 2002; Wasserman & Inui, 1983) – that it is not possible to
answer without quantitative measures of the interaction process. In dealing with them,
even a crude measure is better than no measure. Moreover, it needs to be borne in
mind that the coding and counting of interactional events can and does occur using
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categories that arise from CA (Boyd, 1998; Heritage & Greatbatch 1986; Heritage &
Roth, 1995; West, 1984). The quantitative applications of CA are much narrower and
of more specific scope than the Bales’ system. They concern specific interactional
practices found in specific settings and they arise from careful case-by-case analysis of
those practices. A recent example involves Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) effort to
measure the degree of adversarialness of journalists’ questions in US presidential press
conferences. A coding scheme, like Bales’ IPA, which would be universally applicable,
is not conceivable in CA terms, at least not at the moment.
Emotion as an emergent theme in conversation analysis
My aim in the second half of the paper is to provide an empirical demonstration of the
CA approach, using an example that concerns one of the core themes of social
psychology: the display of emotion. Display of emotions was a central theme for Bales.
In CA, emotion as such has not often been discussed or taken as the topic of research.
However, a number of CA studies deal with phenomena that are relevant for the
understanding of emotions. Moreover, in another important branch of the Sacksian
tradition, discursive psychology, emotion has been explicitly topicalized (Edwards,
1997, 1999, Edwards & Potter 1992). Through formulating some aspects of a CA
approach on emotions, my intention is to further elaborate the contribution CA can
make to the social psychology of social interaction.
Display of emotions
It was pointed out earlier that in investigating preference organization, conversation
analysts have in fact analysed phenomena that are closely related to what Bales called
‘solidarity’. The concept of preference does not, however, cover all the acts that Bales
treated as vehicles of solidarity. Some of the remaining ‘solidarity relevant’ acts involve
displays of emotion: laughter, joy and demonstrations of love and attraction; fear,
anxiety and anger also belong to the ‘socio-emotional area’ (Bales, 1950, pp. 177–181,
188–195). The Balesian tradition has been described as particularly successful in
dealing with emotional aspects of interaction (Wasserman & Inui, 1984). Using Bales’
original approach, researchers have found, for example, that the proportion of acts
involving negative affect in doctor–patient interactions correlate negatively with
patient satisfaction and compliance (Freemon, Negrete, Davis, & Korsch, 1971).
Among the approaches that have taken their inspiration from Sacks, discursive
psychology (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter 1992) has paid the most explicit atten-
tion to emotions. Discursive psychology has focused on the ways in which emotions
are lexically described, avowed and ascribed in talk and in written texts (see Edwards,
1997, 1999; Edwards and Potter, 1992), seeking to show how emotion terms and
descriptions are used ‘in assigning causes and motives of action, in blamings, excuses,
and accounts’ (Edwards, 1997, p. 170). Emotional states, described in text or talk, ‘may
figure as things to be accounted for. . .as accounts. . .and also as evidence of what kind
of events or actions precede or follow them’ (1997, p. 170). Thus, in discursive
psychology, emotion descriptions are seen as an essential resource in accounting of
and accounting for action.
Rather than focusing on the use of emotion terms and descriptions as a resource for
accounts, conversation analysts have focused on more immediate lexical and non-
lexical expressions of emotion. Some studies have examined the organization of
actions that in themselves can be regarded as displays of emotion. Thus, Jefferson
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(e.g. 1984, 1985a) and Haakana (1999, 2001) have studied laughter, Heath has studied
embarrassment (1988) and expression of pain (1989), and Whalen and Zimmerman
(1998) have studied ‘hysteric’ displays of anxiety in emergency calls. These studies
analyse sequences of actions that displays of emotion engender or are part of. Thus
Haakana (1999, 2001), for example, demonstrated how the patient’s unilateral laughter
in Finnish general practice consultations often occurs in sequences where the patient
needs to correct too positive a view of him/herself, suggested by the doctor. For
example, when the doctor enquires about the amount of exercise the patient gets,
her/his candidate understanding may be too high and the patient needs to correct it.
Such corrections are regularly accompanied by the patient’s laughter. Haakana argues
this laughter is a conventionalized way of dealing with the delicacy and the negative
moral implications of the corrections.
In a number of other CA studies, the main focus has been on more complex
activities where the display of emotion forms a part. These include recounting of
troubles (Jefferson, 1980, 1988; Jefferson & Lee, 1992), accounting (Buttny, 1993,
ch. 6), and delivery and reception of good and bad news (Freese & Maynard, 1998;
Maynard, 1997, 2003). Jefferson (1980, 1988), for example, shows how in a troubles-
telling sequence in ordinary conversation, emotional reciprocity is regularly built up
step by step: in the progression from exposition of the trouble by the troubles-teller,
via the affiliation shown by the troubles-recipient, to an affiliation response in which
the troubles-teller is observably ‘letting go’. In what Jefferson and Lee (1992) call
service encounters (occurring in institutional environments), however, this emotional
reciprocity is normally missing, as the recipients regularly do not offer (and the people
with troubles do not seek) affiliation, and the sequence unfolds differently.
On the basis of these existing studies, it is possible to begin to specify the contri-
bution CA can make to the understanding of emotions.3 Sequentiality is the underlying
motif in the Sacksian tradition. Anything that is done in social interaction is done with
reference to the preceding acts and to the anticipated following acts. Actions do not
have meaning in themselves, but they become meaningful through their place in the
self-organizing continuum of actions. The studies cited above show that displays of
emotion are no exception to this. Therefore, in CA, displays of emotion are seen and
examined as parts of larger sequences of action (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998, p. 158;
cf. Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996). To show how CA accomplishes this, I now analyse
two brief sequences of interaction, to further show the basic logic of the approach.
Emotion in announcement sequences
Announcements are one type of sequence where displays of emotion frequently take
place (Maynard, 2003). Schegloff (1995) points out that there are two sorts of
interactional issues posed in announcement sequences, both cropping up especially in
the second pair of parts following the announcements. One involves the registration
whether ‘what has been told is in fact “news’”, and the other involves ‘stance toward
the news’ (p.31). It is in responses displaying stance that the emotional component
often comes into play.
3In this context, theoretical discussion about the ‘nature’ of emotion and affect (e.g., questions about the ‘biological’ vs.
‘cognitive’ theories of emotion) will be neither possible nor needed. I will use the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’
interchangeably, and my interest focuses exclusively on those aspects of emotion/affect that the interactants make publicly
available (through verbal and non-verbal means) for others to observe.
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I analyse two announcement sequences. In one of these the recipient displays strong
emotion (astonishment and alarm), while in the other the recipient remains relatively
unemotional. The analysis seeks to show how the sequences are differently built up,
thereby providing for the different emotional tones. In Extract 1, a young man (‘Jussi’)
has just phoned his aunt. At an early point in the call, the Aunt tells Jussi that her sister
(‘Maila’) has just been admitted to hospital. It is in line 11 where the recipient displays
his astonishment and alarm.4
Extract 1: Beginning of a telephone call
The Aunt answers the phone; this answer is not recorded.
1 Jussi: This is Jussi.=I hope I didn’t @wake you# up,
@ #
2 Aunt: @N:o, #
3 Aunt: .hh I was sleeping so dee@p.
@
4 Jussi: @Oh gosh.
5 I’m sorry you see it’s already twenty past nine,
6 (1.0)
7 Aunt: Real@ly,
@
8 Jussi: @It is h.
9 Aunt: .hhh ( ) I was so exhausted, .hh listen (.) Maila
10 is now .hh in Louhela hospital,
11 Jussi: !Reallyh,
12 Aunt: .hh Yes .hh you know yesterday it got so wild.
13 (1.0)
14 Jussi: "Oh dear,
In line 9, the Aunt gives an explanation (account) for being asleep when the phone
rang. She expands the initial account (exhaustion) by reporting a state of affairs that
explains her exhaustion. Maila (her sister; very close to her, and also known by the
caller) is now in hospital (lines 9–10). The report is designed as an announcement,
rather than merely as an additional part of the account, through the inclusion of the
attention getting marker ‘listen’ (line 11) preceding the report and treating it as an act
on its own right, and through the use of the temporal marker ‘now’ (line 12) which
suggests that the reported status of Maila is new.
In response to the announcement, Jussi says in line 11 ‘Really, h’ (Finnish ‘Iha
tottah’, literally translated ‘Quite true’). His utterance is hearable as astonished and
alarmed, conveying something like ‘I didn’t expect that and I am worried for her’.
What is it about the utterance that makes it hearable this way? At least two aspects are
indicative. First, there is the choice of words and the syntactic structure of the utter-
ance. Through the lexical choices, this response does more than, for example, ‘oh I
see’ would do (see Extract 2, line 8), as ’oh I see’ would only propose that the reported
state of affairs is new information for the recipient. In this sequential position, Jussi’s
response is a question, which conveys ‘ritual disbelief’ in the news. It is an utterance
type conventionalized in the (Finnish) language for expressing epistemic uncertainty
and affect. It proposes that the reported situation is somehow difficult to come to
terms with.5 Second, the prosodic features are equally important. There is stress on the
4The extract is translated from Finnish; the Finnish original and a word-by-word translation are available from the author.
5Note how Jussi uses almost the same words as the Aunt was using in line 7, in response to Jussi telling her that it is
already twenty past nine. (In the original Finnish transcript, there is a slight difference: Aunt says ‘Ihaks totta’, while Jussi
says ‘Iha totta’. Aunt’s turn is explicitly marked as a question with the question marker -ks.) Also the Aunt’s words convey
that the reported situation – in this case the time being so late while she was still sleeping – is difficult to come to terms
with. The prosody of Jussi’s ‘really’ is, however, different.
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first syllable of the utterance (marked with an underlining) and the pitch at the
beginning of the utterance is higher than the pitch in Jussi’s talk in the earlier parts of
the call (marked with an upward pointing arrow). The smileyness that there was in
Jussi’s voice at the beginning of the call has disappeared in line 11, giving way to a
somewhat breathy voice quality. (For CA research on prosody, see Couper-Kuhlen &
Selting 1996, Schegloff, 1998.)
Jussi’s response also prompts the Aunt to give further details about the reported and
responded to state of affairs (Maila being in hospital). In line 12, she first reconfirms
the news (in response to the ‘questioning’ component of Jussi’s initial response in line
11) and then gives a brief description of Maila’s condition on the day she was admitted
to hospital. The key word of the description – Finnish ‘hurjaa’, for which there is no
exact equivalent in translation but which approximates ‘wild’ – maintains an affective
orientation towards the events being described; the intensifier ‘so’ intensifies the
affect. As often in news delivery sequences (Maynard, 1997, 2003 cf. Sacks, 1992b,
pp. 572–573), after the elaboration, the recipient (Jussi) produces an assessment. The
pitch level of his voice goes down. Through this pitch change and the word selection,
the assessment maintains the emotional orientation by conveying sympathy (line 14).
Thus, in Extract 1, it appears that the recipient’s first response to the news has a
strong emotional component, conveyed by prosody and lexical choice (for lexical
choice and prosody in announcement responses, see Freese & Maynard @1998#, and for
the connections of prosody with stance and mood, see Schegloff @1998#). The ensuing
elaboration of the news and assessment maintains an affective orientation.
We may contrast the previous example with the following one in which announce-
ment is also given as an account. However the announcement here is responded to
with a minimal display of affect by the recipient; the key parts of the response are in
lines 8 and 11.
Extract 2: Beginning of a telephone call
1 Liisa: °Liisa Kuittinen°,=
2 Tuula: =.hh It’s Tuula Ranin here hello:,
3 Liisa: !@Hi:. #
@ #
4 Tuula: @.hhhh#[I:: Well erm eh[ I haven’t contacted you for
5 ages as I haven’t @really had time.#=We’re here going
@ #
6 Liisa: @(!Alright) #
7 Tuula: through l- changes in!life.=
8 Liisa: !Oh @"I see.
@
9 Tuula: @hhh W(h)e a(h)re like m- m- moving: to
10 "Valtimo. .hhh@hhhhhhhhhhh# hhh And li@ke m#
@ # @ #
11 Liisa: @Gosh:. # @°( ) #even°
12 Tuula: [m t-erm-eh-eh[ in this situation now then like:
13 fh fh erm of course the economy will get even tighter than
14 what it used to be so like .hh@hh # erm eh I thought
@ #
15 Liisa: @°°Yeah:.°°#
16 Tuula: that(m- eh) I would collect something from the Kotitukku,=
17 Liisa: =Ye:@s that’s quite all right.#
@ #
18 Tuula: @.hhhh!But like # mhhh .mt on the
19 Other hand hand. . .
(Continues with a proposal for the arrangements.)
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After the exchange of greetings, Tuula, the caller, presents an apology for not having
been in touch with Liisa (lines 4–5). The apology – which is accepted by Liisa in
overlap (line 6) – engenders a telling sequence which unfolds in a ‘step-by-step’
manner (cf. Schegloff, 1995, p. 39). Immediately after the completion of the apology,
Tuula ‘rushes through’ to an announcement of ‘changes in life’ (lines 5–7). The
announcement is, through its location, hearable as an account or explanation for the
recent failure to keep in touch. The word selection ‘changes in life’ (line 7) leaves it
unspecified what kinds of changes have happened to Tuula and those close to her,
while it does indicate that the changes are major ones, life changes. Liisa responds
with ‘oh I see’ (Finnish ‘ai jaa’; line 8) which orient to Tuula’s prior talk as an
anouncement (rather than an account) and treat it as news for her (cf. Jefferson, 1981;
Heritage, 1984b). As a news receipt, Liisa’s response also makes it relevant for Tuula to
unpack what the life changes involve (cf. Jefferson, 1985b). The response in line 8
does not, however, take an affective stance to the report of life changes. ‘Ai jaa’/‘Oh I
see’ is a conventional response type in the (Finnish) language for responding to the
prior talk as new information. It foregrounds the epistemic issues and can therefore be
contrasted to ‘Iha totta’/‘Really’ (see lines 7 and 11 in Extract 1) which involve both the
epistemic and the affective component. Neither does the prosody of Liisa’s response in
line 8 convey affect or emotion. The pitch that starts from high and comes down at the
second word ‘jaa’ conveys, I suggest, a readiness to hear more and may in this sense be
empathic, but the utterance does not display its speaker’s own emotional reaction to the
announcement. This neutrality is in line with the oblique character of Tuula’s initial
announcement: she had not indicated whether the changes were good or bad.
In lines 9–10 Tuula proceeds into more detailed telling, partially in overlap with Liisa’s
first response. It transpires that the life change involves Tuula and her family moving to
Valtimo, a rural community some 50 kilometres from the townwhere they currently live
and where Tuula is working. There are elements in the announcement which convey a
degree of affect but the valence of which remains unclear. The announcement is done
somewhat hesitantly – note in line 9 the perturbations prior to the word ‘moving’, and
the prolongation of sound prior to ‘Valtimo’. Moreover, the beginning of the utterance is
accompanied with laugh tokens (line 9), and at the key word of the announcement
(‘Valtimo’), the pitch is lower than in Tuula’s prior talk. These elements give the an-
nouncement a somewhat embarrassed or delicate quality. However, there is no ‘embed-
ded account’ (Heritage, 1984a) available for the delicacy. Moving is often understood as
a happy event, and Tuula has not (yet) revealed reasons for the opposite.
In terms of emotion, Liisa’s response (line 11) also to this latter part of the announce-
ment is neutral – but in a different way than her response to the first part. ‘Gosh:.’
(Finnish ‘Katos vaa:.’; line 11) treats the announcement clearly as new information for
her. Her lexical choice is associated with positive rather than negative emotion: ‘Katos
vaa’/‘Gosh’ would not normally be used at the receipt of bad news. However, there is a
noticeable delay in the outset of the receipt6 and the pitch of Liisa’s talk remains on the
same level as it was in her earlier utterances. These prosodic elements give the
response a reserved quality, curtailing or shadowing the positive affect that could
otherwise have been conveyed by ‘katos vaa’/‘gosh’. Liisa produces another, hardly
audible response later in line 11, overlapping with the continuation of Tuula’s utter-
ance. Judging from the hearable last word ‘even’, this utterance may have an evaluative
character – but in any case, it is produced sotto voce, in a kind of soft manner. In
6The delay may also be related to Tuula’s inbreath in line 10.
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principle, a stronger display of affect would have been possible after an announcement
of a move which necessarily involves a major change of lifestyle.
Thus, in Extract 2, the reception of the announcement was emotionally neutral.
Liisa’s choice to produce such response may be related to at least two things. First, the
status of Tuula’s announcement as action remains subsidiary: it is presented in the
context of the opening of a phone call, as an account for her not having contacted Liisa
for some time, while the ‘reason for the call’ (Schegloff, 1986) has not yet been
revealed by Tuula. Immediately after the announcement Tuula breathes in (line 10),
thus indicating her intention to proceed into some new, not yet revealed action.7
A more affective response by Liisa might have proposed that the announcer elaborate
the news (Maynard, 1997, 2003) – which is what happened in Extract 1. Thus, the
recipient’s emotional neutrality in Extract 2 seems to be in line with the non-focal or
subsidiary status of the announcement. The non-focal status of the announcement is
also reflexively linked to the social relation of the participants (see Maynard, (2003)).
By not giving the news about a life event as a focal action, Tuula treats Liisa as
somebody with whom she is not in very intimate terms, and by withholding emotional
response, Liisa aligns herself accordingly.
Secondly, the way in which Tuula describes her move may present the affective
meaning of the announcement for the speaker as unclear or ambivalent. (In the first
part of the announcement, she uses the term ‘changes in life’ which disguises the
character of the change, and in the latter part of the announcement, there is hesitation,
laugh tokens and a falling pitch when uttering the key place name.) The recipient’s
choice of responsive action, which clearly conveys the newsworthiness of the an-
nouncement but is neutral in terms of affective valence is in line with this. In Extract 1
(where the recipient’s response was emotional) there was no such equivocality
concerning the affective meaning of the announcement for its speaker.
The occurrence or non-occurrence of emotion display as such is something that
a sensitive enough ‘coding and counting’ approach to interaction certainly could
detect8 – the laborious CA analysis is not needed for that. What CA can offer, however,
is to show the various and specific ways in which emotion displays are part of
interactional business, shaped by it and contributing to it (see. Fridlund & Duchaine,
1996). The contrast between Extracts 1 and 2 demonstrates the fact that the display
of emotion is embedded in the sequential organization of action. In Extract 1, the
announcement sequence was built in a way that facilitated the recipient’s display of
emotion, whereas in Extract 2, it was built so as to not facilitate that. These sequences
do not reveal to us how the recipients, in their minds, related to the information
conveyed by the news, but they show how they skilfully designed the display of their
emotional reaction to be coordinated with the other party’s actions and the unfolding
of the sequence they collaboratively are building. Something more complex, collabor-
ative, and fine-grained is at stake in the display of emotion than the existence or
non-existence of acts that can be categorized in ‘socio-emotional’ terms.
CA research on emotions
One task for future studies is to specify what kinds of particulars of speech – word
selection, prosody, gesture, facial expression – constitute displays of emotion.
7The actual reason for the call transpires in lines 12–16: Tuula requests Liisa’s service in purchasing goods from a special
shop with low prices. The financial strains brought about by the move serve as justification for the plea.
8However, if Bales’ original coding scheme were to be applied, it would still remain debatable whether Jussi’s reaction in
line 11 of Extract 1 should be coded in ‘task’ terms, as ‘asks for orientation (information, repetition, confirmation)’ (item 7
in Balesian scheme), or in socio-emotional terms, as ‘shows tension’ (item 11) in the Balesian system).
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Moreover, are there empirical grounds on which we can differentiate the interactional
displays of different emotions, such as joy, sorrow, astonishment etc.? While these
questions have been examined in many disciplines (see e.g. Scherer, Ladd, & Silverman
1984; the recent collections from Harré & Parrott, 1996; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998),
the more specific CA questions involve the organization of these displays and their
intersections with other layers of organization in conversation. In CA, the displays of
affect are examined as parts of sequentially organized practices (such as the delivery
and reception of announcements as above). The technical specification of these prac-
tices is a pre-requisite of the adequate analysis of the affect displays involved in them
(see Schegloff, 1997). On the most general level, actions are organized in terms of first
and second position acts (Schegloff, 1995). We may then ask: what are the features in
specific first position acts (such as an announcement) that make relevant affective
responses? What kind of relevancies do affective responses create for the unfolding of
sequences after the second position, as compared with non-affective responses? What
kind of interactional trajectories follow if a second position act, after an ‘emotionally
relevant’ first position act, is not affective (cf. Sorjonen, 1999, 2001)? In what ways can
recipients recast the prior talk by the co-participant as having contained affective
dimensions even though it might not, on the surface, contain these? Answering ques-
tions like these entails that the line of analysis currently performed by discursive
psychologists (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Edwards & Potter 1992), focusing on the use of
emotion terms, will be expanded to encompass other sorts of lexical and non-lexical
displays of emotion.
This line of research was, in fact, suggested by Sacks (1992b, pp. 572–574) in his
very last lecture: ‘. . .we won’t find that strong sorrow and strong joy are just distributed
over the course of the conversation but instead, there are real places for them to
occur’ (p. 572, italics added). On a general level, the CA perspective on affect and
emotion has involved the empirical specification of these places. Furthermore,
as Whalen and Zimmerman (1998) recently suggested, the sequential analysis of
emotional expressions should also be linked with an analysis of the broader activity
context of emotional talk. Different institutional contexts require, and get realized
through, different ways of displaying, responding to and managing emotion.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have retrospectively compared the Balesian and the Sacksian tradition
of interaction research and, to illustrate that comparison, I outlined the CA approach
to research on emotions. Even though Bales’ IPA is these days mainly of historical
interest, its influence is evident in social psychological interaction research which
categorizes behaviour and counts it. It has been worth while, then, to bring the old
(Bales) and the new (CA) in interaction research into dialogue.
In the first part of the paper, I pointed out that despite the lack of mutual contact
between the two traditions, and the diametrically opposed stances they take on many
fundamental issues, there is considerable overlap in their concerns. The Sacksian
tradition (and more specificially, CA) has considerably expanded our understanding of
the issues that the Balesian tradition was originally designed to examine, re-specifying
the questions and phenomena of interaction research. The choice of method always
arises from what the researcher wants to know. Neither the Sacksian nor the Balesian
tradition provides ways of answering all questions pertaining to social interaction. The
first part of the paper argued, however, that there is a field of primordial interactional
Two traditions of interaction research 15
phenomena that CA, rather than Balesian or other ‘coding and counting’ approaches
can deal with. In the final part of the paper, I outlined an area of research – emotion in
interaction – to demonstrate the detailed way that CA deals with phenomena of a
particular interest for social psychology.
In the CA view, expression of emotion is not a distinct act to be categorized or
otherwise treated separately. Thus, instead of examining distinct acts within the ‘socio-
emotional area’ (as the Balesian researchers would do), CA researchers can explore the
ways in which the display of emotion is incorporated in other actions, such as delivery
and reception of announcements, and the ways in which the emotional components
of these actions contribute to the different trajectories of interaction that these
actions can engender. Here, as in other areas of research, CA is concerned with the
actual methods that the participants use in producing, recognizing and responding to
particular actions.
By comparing and contrasting the two traditions of interaction research, I hope to
have explored the specific character of the contribution that the Sacksian tradition has
made and can continue to make to social psychological research. By discussing CA in
Bales’ terms, I have tried to formulate CA methodology and some of the CA findings in
ways that show their relevance for both general and applied social psychology.
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